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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Scott Onock lacks standing to pursue this derivative action in behalf of Micron

Technology, Inc. ("Micron") because he failed to first make a demand on Micron's Board of
Directors to investigate and evaluate the claims. A "derivative action is an action brought by one
or more stockholders of a corporation to enforce a corporate right or remedy a wrong to the
corporation in cases where the corporation, because it is controlled by the wrongdoers or for other
reasons fails and refuses to take appropriate action for its own protection." McCann v. McCann,
138 Idaho 228, 233 (2002). Thus, a shareholder plaintiff in a derivative action does not assert
claims for his or her own benefit, but rather for the benefit of the corporation. The claim (and any
recovery) belongs to the corporation, not to the shareholder individually. See Tooley v. Donaldson,
Lu@n & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004).
Here, Mr. Orrock alleges that he is a Micron shareholder and purports to bring this
derivative action in Micron's behalf against certain of its officers and directors for allegedly
participating in or failing to prevent price-fixing activity. A derivative action, however, is a
procedural device reserved for rare instances where the corporation's board of directors, normally
entrusted with such decisions because it is presumed to be best situated to determine what is in the
corporation's best interests, cannot be trusted to direct litigation on the corporation's behalf. A
shareholder seeking to assert a claim in behalf of the corporation is normally expected to respect
t
a demand upon it, requesting that the directors investigate and
the role of the board and f ~ smake

determine whether to pursue the action before the shareholder files suit. This is so even if, as is the
case here, the shareholder accuses some directors of wrongdoing.
Nevertheless, Mr. Orrock brought this litigation without first making a demand on
Micron's Board of Directors. Thus, to have standing to sue derivatively, Mr. Orrock must satisfy
an exacting standard: he must plead particularized facts sufficient to show that demand would
have been "futile" because a majority of the Board at the time the action was filed was not
sufficiently disinterested or independent to impartially evaluate the claim. Only then would he be
allowed to take control of Micron's alleged claim from its Board of Directors. Rarely can a
shareholder make the requisite showing, given the high legal standard and presumption that
directors will act in the company's best interests.

Mr. Orrock's task is made much more difficult due to the fact that, of Micron's nine
directors at the time the lawsuit was filed (eight of whom are outside directors with no day-to-day
involvement with Micron), four are not defendants here and their ability to consider a demand is
not challenged. Accordingly, to disqualify a majority of Micron's Board, he must demonstrate
with particularity that not a single one of the remaining five board members can fairly evaluate a
demand. Thus, it is not surprising that, despite multiple attempts and explicit guidance from the
District Court, Mr. Orrock has been unable to plead adequately that demand on Micron's Board
was excused.
As detailed below, the District Court twice granted Micron's motions to dismiss, holding
that Mr. Orrock's generic and conclusory allegations of director dominance, friendships,
compensation, or service on particular committees were insufficient to rebut the presumption that

Micron's directors were independent. Mr. Orrock does not challenge that fmding on appeal.
Additionally, the District Court held that Mr. Orrock failed to plead that Micron's directors faced a
substantial likelihood of liability that would render them interested and, thus, not able to properly
consider a demand. In doing so, the District Court rejected allegations that various news articles
published before mid-2002 constituted "red flags" alerting the Board to price-fixing activity by
Micron employees that should have caused the directors to take action earlier than they did. While
the Board certainly knew about potential antitrust problems after the Department of Justice
("DOJ") issued a subpoena to Micron in June 2002, Micron cooperated actively and fully with the
DOJ and worked to mitigate any damages to the Company. Mr. Onock did not plead any facts
suggesting that the Board should have been aware of the issue or taken action any sooner than it
did, or that its subsequent actions were not enough. Accordingly, because Mr. Orrock failed to
rebut the presumption that a majority of Micron's Board could impartially consider a demand,
demand is not excused. Mr. Orrock thus lacks standing to usurp the Board's authority and pursue
claims derivatively in behalf of Micron.
11.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Micron And Its Board Of Directors

Micron is one of the world's leading providers of semiconductor devices used in a variety
of electronics equipment, including personal computers, network servers, and mobile phones. R.
Vol. 11, p. 287,

7 5; p. 293, 7 22.

One of its principal products is Dynamic Random Access

Memory, or "DRAM," which provides data storage and retrieval. R. Vol. 11, p. 287,y 5.

At the time this action was commenced, Micron's Board of Directors was composed of
nine members, eight of whom were outside directors with no day-to-day management
responsibilities. Only five of the nine directors who comprised the Board of Directors at the time
the lawsuit was filed are defendants here.
The directors who were on the Board when the action was filed and who were named as
defendants are Steven Appleton (Micron's Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of
Directors) and outside directors James Bagley, Robert Lothrop, Gordon Smith and William
Webber. R. Vol. 11, pp. 293-296,vy 23-29. The directors who were on the Board at the time of the
filing of this action and who were not named defendants are Dr. Teruaki Aoki, Mercedes Johnson,
Lawrence N. Mondry and Robert Switz. R. Vol. 11, p. 321,y 107. Mr. Orrock makes no claims of
liability or wrongdoing against the non-defendant directors. A chart listing the directors and
summarizing arguments regarding their alleged interest is attached as Exhibit A.'

B.

June 2002: Allegations Of Micron's Involvement In Price-Fixing Activity
First Come To Light; Micron Promptly Takes Action

In 2002, the Department of Justice initiated an investigation into alleged anticompetitive
practices among DRAM manufacturers. Micron's involvement in the DOJ investigation began in
June 2002, when Micron received a subpoena seeking information regarding possible antitrust

Each of the exhibits referenced herein were exhibits to pleadings filed with the District Court
included in the Certificate of Exhibits. For the Court's convenience, copies of the exhibits are
attached hereto. References to these exhibits will be in the form "Ex. -."

violations. See R. Val. 11, pp. 289, tj 13, p. 309, 176. As the District Court recognized, Micron's
Board responded promptly, fully cooperating with the DOJ investigation and mitigating any
damages to the Company. R. Val. 11, pp. 224,404, 408-409. Indeed, it was widely reported that
Micron cooperated "fully and actively" with the DOJ (including providing the DOJ with evidence)
in connection with the DOJ's Corporate Leniency Policy. R. Val. 11, pp. 314-319,1194-96, 98,
99. Pursuant to the policy, in exchange for Micron's full, continuing and complete cooperation in
the DOJ investigation, Micron was not subject to prosecution, fines or other penalties. Id Certain
of Micron's competitors, on the other hand, were heavily fined, together paying penalties in excess
of $730 million. R. Val. 11, pp. 316-319, tjtj 96, 98, 99; see also id at p. 314, 1/ 93 (Micron
competitors Infineon fined $160 million, Hynix fined $185 million and Samsung fined $300
million as criminal penalties).
Following the announcement of the DOJ investigation, several news articles were
published discussing the investigation and Micron's possible role in price-fixing activity. R. Val.
11, pp. 310-31 1,tjT 77-85. The DOJ investigation also prompted the filing of a number of lawsuits
against Micron and other DRAM suppliers, including over 20 actions in federal court, at least 61
state court actions, three Canadian cases, and a number of actions by state attorneys general. R.
Val. 11, p. 292-293,Y 20. None of Micron's directors were named in those actions.
In February 2006, the first of five securities class action complaints was filed against
Micron and certain of its officers in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, and
those actions have now been consolidated (collectively, the "Federal Action").

The Federal

Action, which is still pending, is premised on purported false and misleading statements regarding
price-fixing activity. Id.
111.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
A.

The First Amended Complaint And Its Dismissal

Mr. Orrock filed his initial complaint in this action on March 6, 2006 against certain of
Micron's officers and directors alleging that they participated in or failed to prevent the pricefixing activity. The complaint mirrored the core allegations of the Federal Action. Following the
filing of an amended complaint in the Federal Action, Mr. Orrock filed an amended complaint here
(the "First Amended Complaint").

Like its predecessor, the First Amended Complaint was

premised on the price-fixing activity alleged in the Federal Action. It asserted various breaches of
duty by the individual defendants based on their purported participation in andlor failure to prevent
allegedly illegal activities.

It claimed further that Micron had been damaged by the costs

associated with the investigation and defense of the various legal actions and by the tarnishing of
Micron's corporate image and goodwill. Mr. Onock admittedly did not make a demand on
Micron's Board prior to instituting this lawsuit, instead contending that demand was futile.
Micron moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 2 3 0 for hilure to make the requisite demand on its Board of Directors, or to plead with
particularity why such demand was excused. Micron also moved to dismiss for lack of standing
based on Mr. Orrock's failure to plead the details of his stock ownership in accordance with the
strictly constmed "continuous ownership" requirement.

In an Order issued on May 29, 2007, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss,
holding that demand on Micron's Board would not have been futile. R. Vol. 11, p. 219. In order to
properly plead demand futility, Mr. Orrock had to allege particularized facts sufficient to create a
reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness and independence of five of Micron's nine directors.
Id. The District Court found that he had failed to do so. Id at 219-226.

First, Mr. Orrock failed to allege particularized facts to rebut the presumption that Micron's
directors were independent. Generic allegations that the directors were unable to act independently
because their compensation was controlled by the members of the compensation committee were
insufficient. Id at 220-221. Likewise, allegations that certain directors worked together in the
past, and that a significant business relationship exists between Micron and another company with
which two directors were affiliated, did not rise to the level of suggesting that any director would
be incapable of considering a demand. Id at 221-222.
Additionally, the First Amended Complaint lacked the particularized facts necessary to
establish that any director had a disabling interest. Mr. Onock was required to allege specific facts
showing that the directors faced a "substantial likelihood of liability," which arises in "rare cases of
egregious conduct" by a director. Id. at 222. Although the Board certainly knew about the
potential issues after the DOJ subpoena issued, the evidence of record showed that the Board fully
cooperated with the DOJ, thereby mitigating any damage to Micron. Id. at 223-224. In light of
the Board's prompt response, Mr. Orrock's effort to show a substantial likelihood of director
liability focused on the Board's supposed pre-subpoena knowledge and conduct. His theory was
that various news articles published in 2001 through mid-2002 constituted "red flags" that alerted

the Board to supposed wrongdoing at Micron, and that the Board's purposell ignorance of the
"red flags" and consequent inaction should subject them to a substantial likelihood of liability. The
District Court, however, did not "agree that these red flags were waved in the faces of the Board or
that they should have been put on notice of the potentially illegal activity occurring within the
DRAM industry as a whole." Id at 223. The facts pleaded did "not suggest that the Board should
have been aware of the problems or that they should have acted to stop further damage to the
corporation sooner."

Id. at 224.

Further, the First Amended Complaint did "not allege

parlicularized facts indicating that Micron directors played any role in the price-fixing or that the
directors knew or should have known about the potential role of Micron employees." Id. at 223.
Because the District Court could not "find that the Board had knowledge of the alleged
wrongdoings by Micron[,]" Mr. Orrock could not show that the Board purposefully disregarded
such knowledge, and thus failed to plead around the strong protections afforded by the business
judgment rule. Id. at 225.
Thus, because the First Amended Complaint lacked particularized facts showing that a
majority of the directors were interested due to a substantial likelihood of liability or lacked
independence, it was insufficient to excuse Mr. Orrock from making a demand on Micron's Board
prior to filing suit. Id. at 226. The District Court granted Micron's motion to dismiss with leave to
amend.

B.

The Second And Third Amended Complaints And Dismissal With Prejudice

Mr. Orrock filed a Second Amended Complaint on June 29, 2007 that was virtually
identical to the First Amended Complaint, albeit with the addition of allegations relating to several

news articles published in and after June 2002 in the wake of the DOJ subpoena. Mr. Orrock also
added allegations that defendant Michael Sadler, Micron's Vice President of Worldwide Sales, met
with other DRAM manufacturers in October 2001 to determine whether they would be cutting
DRAM production, and that Mr. Appleton knew about the trip and had planned his own trip lo
discuss DRAM supply. In connection with the newly cited post-DOJ subpoena articles, Mr.
Orrock argued that demand was futile because Micron's Board knew about the purported
wrongdoing after the DOJ subpoena issued, yet ii did nothing in response. Despite making this
contention, the Second Amended Complaint alleged in numerous places that, following the
issuance of the DOJ subpoena, Micron's Board fully and actively assisted ihe DOJ in its
investigation, thereby mitigating any damage to Micron.
Shortly before Micron was to file its motion to dismiss, Mr. Orrock made an unopposed
request for leave to amend the complaint and, on September 6, 2007, filed his Third Amended
Complaint. The Third Amended Complaint recycled the same demand futility arguments rejected
by the District Court in granting the initial motion to dismiss, including the boilerplate arguments

Mr. Orrock himself abandoned during the briefing on the motion. R. Vol. 11, pp. 321-331, 7 107.
It also included the citations to the post-subpoena articles first alleged in the Second Amended
Complaint (R. Vol. 11, pp. 310-11,

77

77-85, pp. 323-324,

7

107(c)) and the unsupported

allegations regarding Mr. Sadler's October 2001 meetings (R. Vol. 11, p. 307, 77 65-66, p. 323, 7
107Cb)).
New to the Third Amended Complaint were allegations premised on an interview given to
the Idaho Statesman by defendant and then-former Director Gordon Smith. R. Vol. 11, pp. 319-

320,l 101, pp. 324-325, 107(d); Ex. B. Nothing in the intemiew related to price-fixing, however.

Id. In the interview, Mr. Smith discussed Micron's recent layoffs and his feeling that the layoffs
should have happened sooner. He also said that he believed Micron's Board was not well
informed, was "very passive" and was "not near as aggressive as they should be." Ex. B at 1.
Based on Mr. Smith's statements, the Third Amended Complaint claimed that a majority of
Micron's Directors at the time of filing of the derivative action were unable to impartially consider
a demand because, among other things, they allegedly "failed to act when action was necessary[.]"

R. Val. 11, pp. 324-325,l 107(d).
Micron moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint and, in an order dated January 25,
2008, the District Court granted the motion with prejudice. R. Val. 11, pp. 402-41 1. The District
Court again rejected Mr. Orrock's boilerplate allegations of director interest, as well as his
arguments premised on pre-DOJ subpoena "red flags."

Id. at 407-408. Further, absent the

existence of such pre-subpoena "red flags," the Board could not have breached the business
judgment rule by consciously disregarding them. Id. at 410-41 1. As to the arguments based on the
Board's conduct aJter the DOJ subpoena, the District Court reiterated its prior holding "that, once
subpoenaed, it can be presumed that the Board began to cooperate with the DOJ klly and
attempted to mitigate the damages to the company because Micron ultimately was ganted
amnesty. At that point, the directors acted, and thus they are not subject to liability." Id. at 408.
The Third Amended Complaint contained "nothing ... to rebut the presumption that the directors
were acting in good faith." Id. at 409.

The District Court also found that Mr. Orrock again failed to show that a majority of the
Board at the time of the filing of the derivative action lacked the independence to consider a
demand, a ruling Mr. Orrock does not challenge on appeal. The District Court recognized that,
although Mr. Appleton is alleged to have engaged in misconduct, "[c]ommon sense dictates that a
director engaged in wrongdoing himself would not reveal this to the other directors, and thus it is
improper to impute knowledge to the entire Board in a situation such as this." R. Vol. 11, p. 409.
Additionally, nothing in Mr. Smith's interview with the Idaho Statesman suggested that any
directors were dominated by Mr. Appleton and, indeed, "Smith's statements actually support his
independence." Id. Because the Third Amended Complaint did "not aver particularized facts
showing the Directors to be interested and not independent, nor do the facts suggest that the
Directors breached the business judgment rule," the District Court granted Micron's motion with
prejudice. Id. at 41 1. It is fiom this Order that Mr. Orrock now appeals.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
In addition to the issues identified in Mr. Orrock's opening brief, his appeal raises the
following issue:

* whether Mr. Orrock's failure to plead facts showing that he was a Micron shareholder
continuously since the time of the alleged wrong, thereby failing to satisfy the
continuous ownership requirement under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), provides
an independent ground for affirming the District Court's dismissal of the Third
Amended Complaint.

ARGUMENT
1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
As Mr. Orrock notes, the questions of demand futility are governed by the law of the state

of incorporation. Brief at 7;2 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs. Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108-09 (1991).
Because Micron is a Delaware corporation, Delaware law applies. Brief at 7. This Court's review
of the Order granting Micron's motion to dismiss is de novo. Id.
11.

DELAWARE'S RIGOROUS PLEADING STANDARDS IMPOSE A HEAVY
BURDEN ON A PLMNTLFF SEEKlNG TO USURP THE BOARD'S AUTHORlTY
Because the claims asserted in a derivative action belong to the corporation, not to the

shareholder individually, it is incumbent upon a shareholder plaintiff to make a demand upon the
corporation's board of directors before commencing an action. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
.Ienretle, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004); Langer v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 260, 264-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). The board of directors' central role in managing the affairs of the corporation is
a fundamental principle of corporate governance, and the demand requirement is an essential part
of this principle, designed to protect the board's control over corporate affairs and prevent the
wasting of judicial and corporate resources in the "quixotic pursuit of a purported corporate claim
based solely on conclusions, opinions, or speculation." Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,255 (Del.
2000). Demand gives the board the opportunity to evaluate the claims and decide for itself
whether corporate resources should be expended pursuing them. Recognizing the potential for
misuse of the derivative action, some states, such as Idaho, require that a shareholder make a

demand on the board of directors in every case, without exception, in order to ensure that the board
maintains the ability to control the corporation's legal pursuits. See Idaho Code 30-1-742;
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 234 (2002). Other states, such as Delaware, allow for a
limited exception to the absolute demand requirement and permit shareholders to bypass the board
only in the rare case where demand would be futile because a majority of the directors cannot be
expected to fulfill their presumed role and respond based on the corporation's best interests.
Accordingly, a would-be derivative plaintiff who fails to make a pre-suit demand - like Mr.
Orrock - "must meet the 'heavy burden"' of establishing that demand should be excused because it
would be htile. In re Interpublic Sec. Litig., No. 6527, 2004 WL 2397190, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
26, 2004) (quoting White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 551 (Del. 2001)). Futility means that "the
directors are incapable of making an impartial decisioil regarding such litigation."

Rules v

Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1993). Thus, Mr. Orrock bears the burden of creating "a
reasonable doubt that. . . the board of directors could have properly exercised its independent and
disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand." Id at 933-34. See also Guttman v
Huang, 823 A.2d 492,499-502 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Despite the fact that the District Court twice dismissed his complaints for failing to satisfy
these rigorous pleading requirements, Mr. Orrock remarkably asserts that this "is not a difficult
burden for Plaintiff to meet." Brief at 8 n.2. He is plainly mistaken. The requirement that a
plaintiff establish a "reasonable doubt" as to director disinterestedness or independence is not, as

Citations to the Appellant's Brief will be in the form "Brief at -."

Mr. Orrock suggests, a low hurdle. As the District Court correctly recognized, it is a demanding
requirement that "stems from the well-settled principle that directors, rather than the shareholders,
manage the affairs of the corporation, and that the decision of whether or not to bring a lawsuit is
one for the directors." R. Vol. 11, pp. 405-406 (citing cases).
To protect against shareholders seeking to usurp the board's authority, Delaware law
mandates that derivative complaints "must comply with the stringent requirements of factual
particularity that differ substantially from the permissive notice pleadings governed solely by
Chancery Rule 8(a)." Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254. Conclusory factual or legal allegations are
insufficient. Indeed, it is a "critical requirement ... that the complaint must allege with particularity
the reasons for demand excusal," and "[a] prolix complaint larded with conclusory language does
not comply with these fundamental pleading mandates." Rattner v. Bidzos, No. 19700, 2003 WL
22284323, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2003) (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254). Accordingly, courts
routinely reject conclusory allegations when evaluating demand futility.3
Directors are presumed to act in the best interests of the corporation - disinterested and
independent of other influences - absent specific factual pleading by the plaintiff. See Beam ex rel.

Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048-49 (Del. 2004); Aronson
V.

Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d

3

See, e.g., In re Coca-Cola Enterprise, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. 1927,2007 WL 3122370,
at *2 n.14 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2007) (court "does not accept the truthfulness of conclusory
allegations"); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988) ("conclusionary allegations of fact
or law not supported by allegations of specific facts may not be taken as true"), overruled on other
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).

244 (Del. 2000); Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545, 2006 WL 1388744, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 9,
2006) ("directors are entitled to a presumption that they were faithful to their duties"). "[Tlhe
stockholder plaintiff must overcome the powerhl presumptions of the business judgment rule by
alleging suficient particularized facts to support an inference that demand is excused because the
board is incapable of exercising its power and authority to pursue the derivative claims directly."

White, 783 A.2d at 551 (citations omitted). As such, "[pllaintiff s pleading burden ... is [I more
onerous than that required to withstand [an ordinary] motion to dismiss." Levine v. Smith, 591
A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
2000).
Specifically, to satisfy this heavy burden the complaint must contain "particularized
[factual] allegations" sufficient to "create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint was
filed, the board of directors could have properly exercised its [I] independent and [2] disinterested
business judgment in responding to a demand." Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del.
Ch. 1995) (citation omitted). In this appeal, Mr. Orrock has abandoned his argument that any
directors are not independent, focusing only on the contention that certain directors are not
sufficiently disinterested. Brief at 6-23. Even when the directors who would evaluate a demand
are themselves named as defendants in the derivative action, the law imposes an exacting standard
to prevent a plaintiff from casually naming the directors as defendants to avoid the demand
requirement: to plead a disqualifying interest, a plaintiff must set forth particularized facts
establishing that the "potential for [the directors'] liability is not 'a mere threat' but instead may rise
to 'a substantial likelihood."'

Rules, 634 A.2d at 936 (emphasis added) (quoting Aronson, 473

A.2d at 815). A substantial likelihood of liability exists only in "rare cases" in which the
challenged action or inaction is "egregious on its face." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815; see also In re

Bavter Int' I, Inc. S'holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 1271 @el. Ch. 1995) (dismissing complaint
where court could not "conclude from the face of the complaint that this is a rare case where the
circumstances are so egregious that there is a substantial likelihood of liability"). Additionally,
where a specific board decision is challenged, a plaintiff may assert particularized factual
allegations establishing that the challenged transaction was not the product of a valid exercise of
business judgment. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 8 14.
Thus, to establish demand futility here, Mr. Orrock must have alleged with particularity
facts that rebut these powerfit1 presumptions under Delaware law and demonstrate that, at the time
the complaint was filed, at least five out of nine Directors had engaged in such egregious conduct
that they face a substantial likelihood of liability and thus could not have properly evaluated a
demand. As the District Court correctly determined, Mr. Orrock failed to satisfy these onerous
pleading requirements.
111.

M R ORROCK HAS NOT PLEADED PARTICULARIZED FACTS SHOWING
THAT A MAJORITY OF MICRON'S BOARD HAD A DISABLING INTEREST
Mr. Orrock contends that Micron's Board could not properly consider a demand because a

majority of the directors are subject to a substantial likelihood of liability for purportedly (1)
consciously ignoring so-called "red flags" alerting them to price-fixing activity at Micron prior to
the issuance of the DOJ subpoena; (2) failing to take action after the DOJ subpoena issued; and (3)
consciously failing to oversee Micron's operations in general. However, as detailed below, the

District Court correctly found that "the facts, as pled, do not suggest that the Board should have
been aware of the problems or that they should have acted to stop further damage to the
corporation sooner." R. Vol. 11, p. 224.
A.

The Complaint Lacks Particularized Facts Suggesting That Micron's
Directors Knew Of Or Consciously Ignored Price-Fixing Activity Prior To The
DOJ Subpoena

Mr. Orrock attempts to impute pre-subpoena knowledge of price-fixing activity to
Micron's directors based on several tenuous theories, none of which is sufficient to satisfy his
heavy burden of "alleg[ing] facts demonstrating that the directors were actually aware of known
violations, yet took no steps to prevent or remedy the situation." Brief at 10, citing In re Abbot
.
Labs. Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 806 (7t hClr.
2003). In fact, to the extent Mr.

Orrock seeks to impute knowledge to Micron's directors that they did not actually possess, his
efforts are admittedly in vain, as Mr. Orrock himself concedes that the directors must have been
"actually aware of known violations" before there could be a substantial threat of liability. Id.

(emphasis altered). Moreover, it defies logic to claim that a director could consciously disregard
knowledge that he or she didnot acfuallypossess. As such, Mr. Orrock's theories of constructive
knowledge do not support his claim of demand htility.
1.

The Significance Of DRAM To Micron's Business Does Not Suggest
That Micron's Directors Knew About Price-Fixing Activity

Mr. Orrock first invites the Court to impute knowledge to the directors because DRAM
sales represented a large part of Micron's business. Brief at 10-12. He contends that, due to the
importance of DRAM sales, it is "reasonable to infer that the Board was thus aware of at least
major developments in the strategy, pricing and sales of DRAM chips, including Micron's

communications with other major DRAM manufacturers." Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added). This
theory is flawed
The sole derivative case relied on by Mr. Orrock in support of his imputation t h e ~ r yIn
, ~re

Biopure Corp. Derivative Lilig, 424 F. Supp. 2d 305 (D. Mass. 2006), is inconsistent with
Delaware's requirement that he allege facts showing a director's conscious or knowing disregard
of his or her duties. Thus, it is not surprising that Biopure has not been adopted or incorporated
by the Delaware courts. See Connolly v. Gasmire, 257 S.W.3d 831, 851 (Tex. App. 2008)
(rejecting Biopure as not controlling; court "unable to find a Delaware case incorporating or
adopting ... Biopure"; noting Delaware's requirement to plead particularized facts showing
actual knowledge).
In fact, the identical argument advanced by Mr. Orrock was soundly rejected in In re

Forest Laboratories, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 450 F. Supp. 2d 379,390 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). There,
plaintiffs sought to impute to the outside directors knowledge regarding the efficacy of certain
drugs that accounted for up to 82% of the company's sales. The court held that,
[wlhile it is true that (in the securities fraud context) knowledge of facts critical to
the continued viability of major transactions or "core" business operations have
been imputed to a company and its "key" or "top" oflcers..., there is no
authority to support the attribution of knowledge to Outside Directors who
are not alleged to be directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the
company.

4

See Brief at 10-12.

Id. at 390-91 (emphasis added, citations ~mitted).~
In so holding, the court explicitly distinguished Biopure, where the court imputed
"knowledge of information putting 'a company's primary product or service ... in jeopardy."
Forest, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (quoting Biopure Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 308). Because there
were no allegations of potentially "catastrophic consequences for Forest's primary sources of
revenue" or that the company's primary product was "in jeopardy," the case fell "outside the
scope of constructive knowledge cases upon which plaintiffs rely." Id. at 393.
The same is true here, and it is for that reason that Mr. Orrock's attempts to distinguish
Forrest are misplaced. Like Forrest, and unlike Biopure, the Third Amended Complaint lacks
particularized factual allegations of potentially "catastrophic consequences" for Micron's DRAM
business. While it does allege competition between DRAM and RDRAM between 1996 and 1999
(R. Vol. 11, pp. 302-305,

77 47-58), that was years before the "Relevant

Period" defined by the

Complaint as beginning in February 2001 (id at p. 286,Y 1). Moreover, such competition hardly
indicates that Micron's business was in jeopardy at all, let alone in 2001 or later.
Further, the knowledge the plaintiffs sought to impute to the directors of Forrest and
Biopure was that each company's key product was having problems. That is not what Mr. Orrock
seeks to impute to Micron's outside directors. Rather, his imputation theory is much more
attenuated, and lacks logical or factual support

-

that since Micron's directors were aware of

The court found it "unsurprising, then, that none of the Outside Directors are named as
defendants in the related securities class action complaint." 450 F. Supp. 2d at 391 n.12. The
same is true here.

competition with its DRAM product they should also be deemed to have known that Micron would
respond to the competition by engaging in price-fixing activity. Brief at 10-12. The directors had
no reason to suspect that Micron employees would engage in such actions to address a routine
business challenge. Indeed, "absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor
senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees
and the honesty of their dealings on the company's behalf.'' Stone v. Ritter, 91 1 A.2d 362, 368
(Del. 2006) (quoting In re Caremark Int 'I, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959,969 @el. Ch. 1996)).
Lacking the necessary support, Mr. Orrock goes so far as to misstate the criteria for
imputation espoused in Biopure, seeking an "infer[ence] that the Board was thus aware of at least
major developments in the strategy, pricing and sales of DRAM chips, including Micron's
communications with other major DRAM manufacturers." Brief at 11-12 (emphasis added). Yet
his allegations fail even to satisfy this erroneous framework. The Third Amended Complaint
contains no basis for the conclusory - and patently incorrect - assertion that price-fixing activity
was a "major development[] in the strategy, pricing and sales of DRAM chips" ( i d ) as opposed to
isolated activity engaged in by some employees. In fact, to the contrary, the Third Amended
Complaint acknowledges Micron's statement that it "deplores any effort to fix or stabilize prices
and is committed to rectifying past behavior and ensuring that any misconduct will not recur." R.

Val. 11, p. 3 16,195. Accordingly, the Court should not impute knowledge of price-fixing activity
to Micron's eight outside directors.'

2.

The Purported "Red Flags" Are Insufficient To Put The Directors On
Notice That Micron Was Violating The Law

Mr. Orrock further contends that Micron's Board is subject to a substantial likelihood of
liability because they "consciously ignored numerous red flags that would have alerted them to
Micron's role in the price-fixing conspiracy and took no action to ensure that the Company's best
interests were being protected." Brief at 1. The purported "red flags" consist of certain news
articles published between 2000 and 2002 in various publications around the world. Id. at 12. Mr.
Orrock recognizes, however, that in order to meet his pleading burden, he must allege specific
"facts demonstrating that the directors were actually aware of known violations, yet took no steps
to prevent or remedy the situation." Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (citing Abbott Labs, 325 F.3d at
806). Mr. Orrock has not come close to satisfying this exacting standard, as the articles he cites are
woefully insufficient to constitute "notice of serious misconduct" at Micron. David B. Shaev Projf
Sharing Account v. Armstrong, No. 1449,2006 WL 391931, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13), affd mem.,
91 1 A.2d 802 (Del. 2006) (plaintiff must allege facts showing that "the directors were conscious of

'

In a variation on this refrain, Mr. Orrock also argues that Micron's Board should have been
on notice of price-fixing activity because Micron cut its supply of DRAM by 20% over the course
of seven months and because DRAM prices subsequently rose in early 2002. Brief at 15. Even if
true, there is nothing unusual about a reduction in supply and consequent increase in price; this
basic economic principle is implemented every day by businesses of all varieties and sizes. There
would be no reason for any Board member to think that this routine manifestation of supply and
demand must be the result of an illegal price-fixing conspiracy.

the fact that they were not doing their jobs and that they ignored red flags indicating misconduct in
defiance of their duties").
The November, 2000 CNN Monev Article. Mr. Orrock contends an article claiming that
manufacturers "dragged their feet in RDRAM production, keeping the prices high and uptake
slow," somehow put the Directors on notice of Micron's role in an alleged price-fixing
conspiracy.7 R. Val. 11, p. 306,

7 62;

Brief at 12. However, the article's only reference to

Micron is to note that Micron had sued Rambus for collecting dues on unenforceable patents. R.
Val. 11, p. 306, 7 62. The article does not mention collusion between any manufacturers, let
alone suggest that Micron was involved in price-fixing activity. Id.
The August, 2001 Silicon Strateaies Article.

According to this article, certain

unidentified "DRAM manufacturers met to discuss measures that could be taken to halt 'the
downward spiral of DRAM prices."' R. Val. 11, p. 307,T 67; Brief at 12. Yet Mr. Orrock does
not allege any facts suggesting that Micron participated in the meetings, nor does he allege any
reason why Micron's Board should suspect Micron's involvement. Id
The November, 2001 Articles. Two articles published in November 2001 commented
that analysts did not know why DRAM prices were rising. R. Val. 11, p. 308, 7 69; Brief at 12.
Mr. Orrock does not allege that the articles even mention Micron, let alone allege collusion
between Micron and other DRAM suppliers. Nor does he offer any facts explaining why

It is important to note that the DOJ investigation concerned pricing for DRAM, not RDRAM,
which is a different memory technology and product that Micron never sold. R. Val. 11, p. 288 289,77 7-13.

Micron's Board should have assumed that DRAM price increases were the result of wrongful
conduct, as opposed to the myriad market forces that routinely impact prices. Mr. Orrock
certainly fails to allege facts sufficient to put the Board on notice that, if there was a price fixing
conspiracy, Micron was somehow involved. Id.
The May 2002 Articles. In May 2002, the Detroit News and Taipei Times reported that a
Taiwanese chip maker had agreed with other unnamed manufacturers to restrict DRAM sales in
order to boost prices. R. Vol. 11, p. 309,y 72; Brief at 12. Again, there is no mention of Micron,
nor are any facts alleged suggesting that Micron may have been involved in the purported
conspiracy. Id.
In sum, Mr. Orrock has not pleaded the requisite "red flags" to establish a substantial
likelihood of liability arising from the conscious disregard of known violations. He points to a
handful of articles published over the span of two years, but none even mentions Micron in
connection with alleged price-fixing activity, let alone constitute notice to the Board that Micron
employees were engaged in price-fixing activity. Mr. Orrock argues that the fact that none of the
articles "mention Micron is of no consequence" because they "refer to potential price-fixing
among the DRAM manufacturers[.]" Brief at 13-14 (emphasis added).

But, even in the

aggregate, the articles do not suggest that Micron was engaged in wrongful conduct. A
smattering of articles over several years "hint[ing]" at "potential" wrongdoing by other DRAM
manufacturers does not imply that Micron was involved in misconduct, and certainly does not
establish that the Board was "actually aware of known violations" yet "consciously disregard[ed]
a known duty." Brief at 12-13. Mr. Onock's "red flag" allegations thus fall far short of pleading

a substantial likelihood of liability for any of Micron's directors. See, e.g. Ash v. McCall, No.
17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *4, 15-16 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000) (granting dismissal despite
alleged "red flags," including published articles and reports questioning HBOC's accounting
practices); Spear v. Conway, No. 401919/03, 2003 WL 240121 18, at *2, 6 (N.Y.Sup. Oct. 17,
2003) (granting dismissal despite alleged "red flags," including public criticism by then SEC
Chairperson Levitt).
Moreover, aside from the fact that the content of the articles is insufficient to put the
Directors on notice of any wrongdoing, Mr. Orrock fails to allege facts suggesting that any Board
members ever read the cited articles. Further, the Third Amended Complaint cites no notes,
reports, memos, "or board meeting minutes reflecting conversations from which the Court may
infer that the [I Directors had actual knowledge of [the purported red flags] or any other alleged
inside information." Forest, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 390. See also Guttman, 823 A.2d at 503
("Entirely absent from the complaint are well-pled, particularized allegations of fact detailing the
precise roles that these directors played at the company, the information that would have come to
their attention in those roles, and any indication as to why they would have perceived the [alleged
problems]"). The absence of facts establishing Board awareness of the purported "red flags" is
fatal to Mr. Orrock's attempt to establish director interest. Forrest, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 396
(demand futility allegations inadequate where "[tlhere is nothing in the Amended Complaint to
suggest or permit the court to infer that any of the alleged 'red flags' ever came to the attention of
the board of directors or any committee of the board.") (quoting In re Citigroup, Inc Shareholders

Litig.,No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 5), a f d mem., 839 A.2d 666 @el.

3.

Allegations Regarding Mr. Sadler's October 2001 Trip Are Inadequate
To Establish A Disabling Interest

Allegations of a secret trip by Mr. Sadler in October 2001 do not expose Micron's outside
directors to a substantial likelihood of liability. Mr. Orrock alleges that Mr. Sadler traveled to
Europe and Asia in October 2001 "to meet with other CEOs to determine whether some of the
other DRAM manufacturers would be cutting DRAM production." R. Vol. 11, p. 307,

7 65.

According to the Third Amended Complaint, Mr. "Appleton was aware of defendant Sadler's
October 2001 trip and the purpose behind it" and "himself planned to fly to Munich to meet with
secretly with Infineon and the Samsung CEO about cutting back DRAM production." Id.., 7 66.

Mr. Orrock goes on to argue that "it is reasonable to infer that information regarding the
Company's role in the conspiracy was shared with fellow directors Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and
Webber at various meetings of the Board and committees thereof." R. Vol. 11, p. 323,l 107(b).
These wholly conclusory allegations add nothing to Mr. Orrock's demand futility
argument. As an initial matter, the Third Amended Complaint contains no facts to support the
claim that Mr. Appleton knew about the trip's purportedly improper purpose. While Mr. Orrock's
Appellate Brief cites to recent testimony in another litigation (Brief at 14), those allegations are not
included in the Third Amended Complaint and thus have no bearing on the adequacy of that
pleading.
Even if Mr. Appleton was aware of misconduct, however, Mr. Orrock's proposed inference
that Mr. Appleton must have told the outside directors about the alleged misconduct is comple.tely

devoid of factual support. The Third Amended Complaint leaves critical questions unanswered,
such as how and when did Mr. Appleton supposedly communicate the information to the other
Board members, and what information did he communicate? Mr. Orrock offers no facts
whatsoever regarding any specific documents, conversations, meetings or reports from which the
directors are alleged to have learned of the purported misconduct. See Ratfner, 2003 WL
22284323, at *10 n.53 (rejecting conclusory allegations of directors' knowledge of wrongdoing
that "fail[ed] to allege with particularity what information the directors knew and how they
acquired such knowledge").
Nor does Mr. Orrock's generic reference to "assum[ed but unspecified] proper govemance
procedures" fill the gap or provide any support for an inference that the directors were aware of
misconduct. Brief at 15. Abbott, upon which Mr. Orrock relies for this proposition, does not hold
otherwise. There, the FDA sent a number of warning letters to company executives, including the

Chairman of the Board, detailing multiple violations it had uncovered relating to the company's
products. Abbott, 325 F.3d at 799-800. Further, the "FDA's problems with Abbott were public
knowledge."

Id. at 806.

The Court held that "[ulnder proper governance procedures ...

information of the violations would have been shared at the board meetings." Id. Here, by
contrast, Mr. Orrock alleges a secret "conspiracy" among DRAM manufacturers (Brief at 15) that
would plainly not be the subject of Board discussion under the governance procedures that Mr.
Orrock assumes exist but does not describe. Indeed, as the District Court correctly recognized,
"[c]ommon sense dictates that a director engaged in wrongdoing himself would not reveal this to
other directors, and thus it is improper to impute knowledge to the entire Board in a situation such
as this." R. Vol. 11, p. 409. Thus, Mr. Orrock's unsupported assertions of director knowledge are

plainly insufficient. See, e.g. Rattner, 2003 WL 22284323, at *lo, 11 (rejecting allegations

"withoutany particularized facts, that the Director Defendants knew of inside information").

Mr. Orrock has thus failed to plead particularized facts showing that, before the DOJ
subpoena issued, the Directors were actually aware of price-fixing activity or that such knowledge
could be imputed to them. Further, it goes without saying that a director cannot address or ignore
something he does not actually know about. Thus, absent any actval knowlcdgc of the purported
"red flags," it is impossible to consciously disregard them. Not surprisingly, then, Mr. Orrock
fails to "point to facts suggesting a conscious decision to take no action in response to red flags.
Without these well-pleaded allegations, there is no possibility the defendants faced a substantial
likelihood of liability." Forest, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (quoting Stone v Ritter, No. 1570, 2006
WL 302558, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26), aff'd, 91 1 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)).

B.

Micron's Directors Responded Promptly To The DOJ Subpoena And Do Not
Face A Substantial Likelihood Of Liability For Their Post-Subpoena Conduct

Unable to plead particularized facts sufficient to show that Micron's Board knew of, yet
consciously and wrongfully disregarded, price-fixing activity by Micron's employees before
k forced to shift his theory of demand
accusations of misconduct became public, Mr. O ~ ~ o cwas
futility in his Third Amended Complaint. He argues that the Director Defendants "were aware at
least as of June 2002 that Micron was likely involved in the DRAM price fixing conspiracy" based
on the many news articles that were published following Micron's disclosure of the DO3 subpoena.

R. Vol. 11, pp. 323-324,n 107(c). Mr. Orrock hrther alleges that, "[dlespite the investigation and
related news articles, Micron's Board took no action to determine the role of Micron and its
employees in the conspiracy ... [and] utterly failed to take any affirmative steps to uncover the true
facts regarding Micron's participation in the wrongdoing alleged herein."

Id. Based on these

allegations, Mr. Orrock claims that there is a substantial likelihood of liability on the part of a
majority of the Board and, thus, that demand on the director defendants would have been futile.
There are several problems with this theory.
First and foremost, the theory is based on an erroneous premise. Mr. Orrock's contention
that Micron's Board "took no action" following the issuance of the DOJ subpoena is patently
wrong. In fact, it is contradicted by the very allegations of the Third Amended Complaint, which
quotes multiple reports that Micron was cooperating "fully and actively" with the DOJ, including
providing the DOJ with evidence relating to the alleged price-fixing activity. R Vol. 11, pp. 314-

3 19,yy 94 - 96, 98, 99.

It goes without saying that, to actively cooperate with the investigation

and provide the DOJ with evidence, Micron must have undeaaken an investigation of its own to
find such evidence. Additionally, the Third Amended Complaint concedes that the Board's actions
sewed to benefit Micron: in exchange for Micron's full, continuing and complete cooperation in
the DOJ investigation, Micron would not be subject to prosecution, fines, or other penalties. Id.
To qualify for such treatment, the DOJ requires, among other things, that the corporation take
"prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity." Ex. C at 1, 3. Fnrther, the
Complaint acknowledges Micron's representation that it is committed to going beyond "rectifying
past behavior" and has taken steps to "ensur[e] [that] any misconduct will not recur." R. Vol. 11, p.

316,

7 95.

Micron's efforts include the implementation of "strong governance practices and

comprehensive compliance programs." Id. Thus, the theory that Micron's Board took no action in
response to allegations of price-fixing activity is belied by the allegations of the Complaint, is
plainly wrong, and does not support a substantial likelihood of liability.

Undaunted by the facts alleged in his own complaint, Mr. Orrock remarkably claims that
the Board failed to act, with "no Board investigation, no committee charged with conducting an
investigation, no interviews with Micron employees or other representatives[.]" Brief at 18. This
allegation is based solely on the fact that Mr. Orrock is unaware of any such action because he was
"unable to find anything" after "conduct[ing] his own investigation." Id. But Mr. Orrock did not
enlighten the Court as to the details of his "investigation," which may have consisted of nothing
more than scanning some newspapers and the internet. Mr. Orrock surely did not make a books
and records request to Micron, and there is nothing in the Third Amended Complaint to suggest
that he spoke to Micron insiders regarding the Board's response to the allegations of price-fixing
activity. Accordingly, there is no reason Mr. Orrock would be privy to information about an
internal investigation conducted by Micron and its independent outside counsel. He would not
have access to any interview notes, memos, or findings of Micron's investigation. But Mr.
Orrock's ignorance is by no means proof that the Company did not act quickly and appropriately in
response to the allegations of misconduct. Nor is his argument that "Defendants presumably
would have brought any other actions taken on behalf of Micron to the District Court's
attention[.]" Brief at 18. In briefing their motions to dismiss, defendants are limited to relying on
documents referenced in the pleadings or subject to judicial notice. Consequently, board minutes
and other documents discussing the Board's response to the allegations of price-fixing fall outside
the scope of the briefing. Micron's adherence to the rules of civil procedure should not be seen as
evidence that its Board failed to act appropriately. When construed against the contradictory
evidence referenced in the Complaint - that Micron promptly acted by, among other things,
investigating the claims, identifying evidence, and producing the evidence to the DOJ, thereby

obtaining amnesty - Mr. Orrock's bare assertion that he could not find signs of any action taken by
the Board should be d i ~ r e ~ a r d e d . ~
Faced with such indisputable evidence of Micron's prompt and effective actions, Mr.
Orrock belittles the Board's efforts, arguing that "merely" cooperating with the DOJ, thereby
avoiding millions of dollars in fines, is somehow not enough. Brief at 17. According to Mr.
Orrock, Micron has been forced to bear the costs of the litigation associated with the alleged pricefixing activity, and defendants could have somehow prevented that harm had they "actively and
thoroughly investigated the wrongdoing with an eye toward the best interests of Micron[.]" Id. at
18. However, the barrage of litigation against Micron began shortly after the DOJ subpoena
brought the issue to the attention of the Board and the public (see R. Vol. 11, p. 292, 7 20), and
there is no allegation that the misconduct continued after that point. Once the subpoena issued,
there was nothing the Board could have done to prevent the litigation that was sure to follow.
Mr. Orrock's reliance on dicta in Conradv. Blank 940 A.2d 28 (Del. Ch. 2007), is
misplaced. In Conrad, the court commented on the company's failure to divulge details regarding
its investigation and remedial measures, musing that "it would be odd if Delaware law required a
stockholder to make a demand" in that situation. Id. at 38. The court, however, made clear that
such remarks were not part of its demand htility analysis. Id. at 37 (comments were made
"[blefore analyzing [the] issue" of demand futility). Mr. Orrock concedes as much, but insists that
the dicta "provides significant guidance on the question of demand futility[.]" Brief at 19. It does

*

Mr. Orrock cites in a footnote Mr. Smith's interview with the Idaho Statesman in an attempt
to bolster his contention that the Board consciously refused to act. Brief at 20-21, n.6. The
interview does not provide the missing support, as Mr. Smith said nothing at all about the Board's
awareness of or response to the price-fixing activities alleged here. Ex. B.

not. Instead, Mr. Orrock's spin on the Conrad dicta is merely a variation on the theory, "if they
were inclined to sue, they would have done so before now," which Delaware courts reject as
"hav[mg] no basis in fact and in law." Richardson v. Graves, No. 6617, 1983 WL 21 109, at *3
(Del. Ch. June 17, 1983).~"The mere fact that they have not elected to sue before the derivative
action was filed should not of itself indicate 'interestedness.' As a matter of fact, it is the Board's
inaction in most every case which is the raison d'etre for Rule 23.1." Id A board of directors has
wide latitude under the business judgment rule to respond lo potential misconduct in a manner it
believes is in the company's best interests. Indeed, if Mr. Orrock had made a demand on Micron's
Board in this case, the Board's response would be afforded deference under the business judgment
rule. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981). Mr. Orrock admittedly does not know what the Board did
when it learned of the price-fixing activity (aside from obtaining amnesty and avoiding millions of
dollars in fines and penalties), and his uninformed opinion is inadequate to overcome the strong
presumptions of the business judgment rule. The directors are thus not subject to a substantial
likelihood of liability for their post-DOJ subpoena actions.
C.

Micron's Directors Do Not Face A Substantial Likelihood Of Liability For
Allegedly Failing To Monitor Or Oversee Micron's Operations

Mr. Orrock's final argument (Brief at 21-23) is based on the "CaremarlZ' theory of liability
for failure of oversight. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
However, his failure to establish a substantial likelihood of director liability based on any of his
other theories forecloses the possibility of success on his Caremark claim, which is recognized

See also Blasbandv. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1052 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[A] board's failure to take
action, even if it is aware of wrongdoing, does not demonstrate futility") (citing cases).

as "possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to
win a judgment."

Id. at 967. Caremark requires that a plaintiff adequately allege that the

directors knew or should have known that violations of law were occurring, and that the directors
took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy the situation. Id at 971. Mr. Orrock must
allege that the Board "utterly fail[ed] to exercise oversight of the corporation." Armstrong, 2006
WL 391931, at *5. But it is not enough for him to allege that the directors should have done a
better job. Rather, the "imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that
they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations." Stone, 91 1 A.2d at 370 (emphasis added).
Yet, as detailed at length above, the Tbird Amended Complaint lacks the facts necessary to satisfy
this difficult standard. Mr. Orrock has not alleged any particularized facts to establish that
Micron's directors had actual knowledge of price-fixing activity prior to the issuance of the DOJ
subpoena, nor has he alleged facts warranting the imposition of constructive knowledge on the
Board. Moreover, the Board could not have acted on or consciously disregarded information they
did not possess.
Mr. Orrock's reliance on Ash v. McCall, No. 17132,2000 W L 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15,
2000), as the only authority in support of his Caremark claim is puzzling given that the Court in
Ash dismissed Caremark claims premised on "red flags" much more salient than those alleged

here. In Ash, the "red flags" alleged to have alerted the board to accounting inegularities
included a Bloomberg article and two reports published by the Center for Financial Research &
Analysis criticizing and questioning the company's accounting practices. Id. at *4. Moreover,
one of the reports "garnered a fair amount of media attention, was the focus of much analyst

commentary, and appeared to have some impact, albeit brief, on HBOC's share price." Id. at *15.
Although "[tlhese facts indicate that HBOC, at some organizational level, knew of and
responded to public criticism of its accounting practices" the court held that "Plaintiffs have not,
however, alleged facts that HBOC's directors had actual knowledge of these events and,
therefore, possessed actual knowledge of potential accounting irregularities." Id. Nor did the
board have constructive knowledge, even thought the Company's public relations department
actually responded to the report. Id.
While the court did leave open the hypothetical possibility that demand could be excused
if plaintiffs "allege[d] particularized facts that might enable this Court to infer that HBOC
directors

... did possess knowledge of facts suggesting accounting improprieties ... and took no

action to respond to them" (id.), demand was not excused in Ash and it should not be excused
here, where the purported "red flags" pale in comparison to those rejected by the Ash court
Unlike the prominent articles and reports directly challenging company-specific practices in Ash,
the purported "red flags" here are nothing more than a smattering of articles published in various
markets around the world that did not even mention Micron by name, let alone accuse it of
participating in price-fixing activity.

Lacking particularized facts establishing director

knowledge and conscious disregard of price-fixing activity, Mr. Orrock's Caremark claims fail
to raise a substantial likelihood of liability. Accordingly, demand is not excused and Mr. Orrock
lacks standing to pursue claims in behalf of Micron.

IV.

MR. ORROCK'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 23(F) PROVIDES AN INDEPENDENT GROUND FOR
AFFIRMING DISMISSAL
Wholly separate from the issue of demand htility, the Third Amended Complaint is also

defective because it, like its predecessors, fails to satisfy the continuous ownership requirement of
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Tlis failure provides an independent ground for affirming the
District Court's dismissal. Hanf v Syringa Realty Co., 120 Idaho 364, 370 (1991) ("Our prior
cases have held that we will uphold the decision of a trial court if any alternative legal basis can be
found to support it") (citing Foremost Ins Co. v Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 144-45 (1981);

Anderson & Nafiiger v G.T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179 (1979)).
Rule 23(f) requires Mr. Orrock to allege that he "was a shareholder or member at the time
of the transaction of which [he] complains[.]" Idaho Civ. Proc. Code

5 23(f).

To satisfy the rule,

he must "indicate when [he] bought stock.. . and [he] must state that [he has] owned stock
continuously[.]" In re Sagent Tech., Inc Deriv. Litig., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1096 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (interpreting the exact same language in Rule 23.1).'~ While this is not a difficult task,
compliance is strictly enforced."

'O See also In re Omnivision Technologies, Inc. See. Litig, No. 2297,2004 WL 2397586, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004) (dismissing complaint because plaintiff had failed to specifically plead

that the dates of his stock ownership were contemporaneous with relevant period of alleged fraud).
" See, eg. In re New Valley Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 17649, 2004 WL 1700530, at *3
@el. Ch. June 28,2004) (holding Delaware's similar "continuous ownership" requirement "has
become a bedrock tenet of Delaware law and is adhered to closely"); Desimone v Barrows, 924
A.2d 908, 927 (Del. Ch. 2007) (strictly applying continuous ownership requirement and
dismissing claims predating stockholder's stock ownership); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 359
(Del. Ch. 2007) (same).

Here, however, despite having several opportunities, Mr. Orrock inexplicably refuses to
reveal the details of his purported ownership of Micron stock. He has not even alleged that he
owned stock "continuously" during the Relevant Period. Instead, he simply claims that he "is and
was an owner of the stock of Micron during times relevant . . . and remains a shareholder of the
Company." R. Vol. 11, p. 321,lj 106. One of the key reasons for the contemporaneous ownership
requirement is "to curtail shike suits by prohibiting potential plaintiffs from buying into a lawsuit
by purchasing stock in a corporation after the alleged wrong has occurred."

Blasband v Rales,

772 F. Supp. 850, 858 (D. Del. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 971 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted). Yet Mr. Orrock's vague representation that he owned Micron stock "during
times relevant" fails to address this important concern and does nothing to dispel the possibility
that he "bought a lawsuit" by purchasing Micron stock well after the alleged price-fixing activity
became the subject of national attention (and several other lawsuits). Notably, Mr. Orrock does not
claim that he owned Micron stock "during all times relevant," but just during "times relevant" to
the purported wrongs. R. Vol. 11, p. 293,

7 21.

Coupled with his expansive definition of the

"Relevant Period" as running from Februaw 2001 through the present (R. Vol. 11, p. 287,

I), Mr.

Orrock could have purchased his shares mere moments before filing suit and sold it moments later.
There is nothing in the Third Amended Complaint to suggest otherwise.
If Mr. Orrock's essentially meaningless representation of stock ownership "during times
relevant" is deemed sufficient, it would eviscerate the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(f) and leave its important policy interests unfulfilled. Given the negligible burden of

pleading specific dates of stock ownership, such a result is clearly not warranted. Accordingly, the
Complaint is subject to dismissal for this independent reason.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Orrock's demand futility allegations fail if even one of the director defendants is
capable of considering a demand. Yet the Third Amended Complaint lacks the particularized
factual allegations necessary to disqualify any outside director. Additionally, Mr. Orrock's failure
to satisfy the continuous ownership requirement of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23(0 provides an
independent basis for dismissal. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Micron respectfully
requests that the Cotut affirm the District Court's order granting Micron's motion to dismiss with
prejudice.
Dated: December 17,2008
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July 20,2007

Dan Popkey's entire interview with Gordon Smith
Question-and-answer with Micron Director Gordon Smith, who is calling for the removal of CEO Steve Appleton:
Q: Can you address the anxieties about Micron's future i n Idaho?
A: Let me kind of preface this by telling you that Ithink there's a lot of things that needed to be changed, and the wmments that I'limake to
you are my own. But I would say this: The board that we have now is wmpletely different than what you might exped wming from Boise,
Idaho. It's made up primarily of people that are in the high-tech industfy, which isn't nacessarily bad. Blnthe problem is they wme frum large
companies who have a wmpletely different wlture. They come from wmpanies that are probably used to making changes. How do Isay
thls? I wouldn't necessarily say getting rid of peopie when they have to, but they do. And it's something that Micron has, over the years, has
never experienced. There have been layoffs,but nothing of the magnitude that we're talking now.
This is probably the first cut, and I'm not saying that there'll be more, but certainly 1 would guess that what Steve (Appleton) has got In the
back of his mind is tnere will be jobs that will be transfened -say they'll either be outsourced w they'll be bansferred to other countries.
Some of these jobs the peopie may have a chance to keep the jobs they have, if they're willing to transfer. Very possibly to a foreign country,
South-st Asia. That's kind of the hotbed for the tech industry. China. Singapore. Taipei. You know, all those places. That's kind of where this
industry Is really focusing right now. You take China and India with all the people that they have, and yw know, they're very aggressive as far
as trying to make their mark in the world with anything that relates to the high tech, wmputers and that sort of thing.
Q: Will there be more layoffs?

A: That Ican't tell you for sure because Idon't think anybody at Micron really knows. And Ithink they're trying to work themselves through this
thing. What they're gonna have to do is get to a level where they can make money, they can lower their costs, and rlght now they're not there.
Q: How did the decision to lay off workers occur7
We'd naa several dlscLssons abobt tnis and $1all k.nd of was precip;tated by the faa that wc werenl makng money. We were wncerned
about shareholdor valLe and what wd!d oe done lo correct it. And. obvlwsly, the trst place you look is whether or Mt we're wmpetit~vein lhe
world We weren't. So. yeah, the board expressed their mnceins aboJt thls several different times and finally the management group picked
up the ball and started their own sessions about what wuld be done. They had wme back to the board with this plan ofwhere thev were
gonna have to downsize, outsource and even move some jobs to other &unIsies. On the surface, to the board, itswnded like something that
had to be done and might possibly be a solution.
Q: Are you convinced this is the right solution?

A: No, and I'll tell you what, and this is my own opinion, and I'm gonna kind of step out of line here just a little bit, but this board that we have
now in my estimation is very passive. They all wme from big wmpanies. They've ail got Lheir own problems. And for them to turn around and
get right into the middle of the Micron problems I think it'sa little more than what they want to take on. OK? Now thars my opinion.
P: Are you saying the board is not involved as it should be?

A: The board is not near as aggressive as they should be
Q: What would you have liked to have seen different, in hlndslghl?

A Th s goes way oack, but I could see thal the wlture of the company out lhere was changing.... l lnink ths goes back to about the t'me, just
prior to, or let's say aboLl four, live years ago Iwuld soe a real change wming on . .The new d;rectors lhat came on and are on there noa.
thevre really not famll;ar ~ i i what
h went on in the past. So, all they know is what they've seen snce they've been on the board. We lost (board
member) Tom Nicholson We lost (board member) Bob Lothrop and it was just prior to those fellows ieaving that Imuld see this change
coming.

Q: Are you saying the board just doesn't know enough?

A: No, these guys that are on the board now, they're very knowledgeable about the industry. There's noquestionabout that. They know the
industry. They haven't had enough experience with Micron to, I think, really dig into this problem - because this is a problem that's been
building for quite some time.
Q: Are you saying the board went to management and said 'Look, we've got competitiveness problems, we naad to address them:
and then management came back with this plan for redudion In force?
A: Right. The board started expressing their wncerns, because we'd had a number of wnversations about the lack of shareholder value. We
weren't making enough money, we weren't making money, our stock prices were way down from where they had been in prior years. And you
know, it was a concern

ilai~
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Q: When was that first broached?
A: Oh, golly. I'd say we first started talking about that several years ago.

Q: Did management not act quickly enough?
A Tn.s is the first real pos 1ve step that the $llanayen!entgroup has taker,. Now.. pricr lo hat, I Utirih they Uied sonle different stmtegic moves

wnich. l'd have lo say a1 tne best, were lust mayoe barely successhi . . Foemmtanu?. we've kind of wt back on our DRAM production
oecause thars a very mmpet,We pan of the business. Everybody's in it, everywdy can makea DRAM, but the key to it is you've got lo haw
onto that DRAM business and that technology because it forms the basis for so many other things. We have an imaging group out
there...initially they were very successful, b;t as time goes on more and more other companies get into It, it becomes more competitive and if
you'regoing to make any money, you've got to be the low-wst producer.
Q: When did you lose the competitive edgdand why?

A I'd sag we swrted loslng the compet8tlve odge five. SIX years ago We should have tanen a good look at what wo were domg, mu we wete
oo~na1t If we were !he hlqh cost producer or we were headad m that direction, maybe steps should have been taken then to uwnler that
Q: Why weren't they?

A: YOUcan lay that on the management group, or you can lay it on the board, but somewhere. You know that's what you're there for. is to try
to head those things off before they get started
Q: Do you felt some regret and responsibility for thls?

A: Well, I feel real bad about the whole situation and Ithink, here again, had the board been a little morb aggressive and maybe a little more
inquiring, maybe we could have stopped some of this. But we didn't.
Q: What's the future for Steve Appleton? What does it mean that he lost the title of president, and, are you confident in his
leadership as CEO?
A. Well, let me p.11it this way For quite a long time. Steve has helo the tite of Chairman of tne Board. Chief Exewtlve Officer and Preslden!.

That's too many t~llestoo many jobs for one guy. tn a wmpany the size of Mlcron. You can't do i l And we\e had numerous discussions with
Steve about me fact that he ought to give up some of those titles and bring, so to speak, h s replacement on board.
Q: So was this the board's decision t o give the presidency t o Mark Durcin?

A: Mark is a very sharp guy, very technically oriented. Whether Mark is a money-maker I can't teti you. That's something that we need to really
determine.
Q: Is he your next CEO?

A: Well, let's put it this way: He's in line for it. It doesn't necessarily mean that he'd be the CEO, but he's certainly the only guy out there right
now that you'd look to if you're gonna look in-house.
Q: Are you confident in Appleton's leadership as CEO g ~ e that
n you regret someof these costeuttlng moves didn't come sooneR
I'm one of seven, but I'm gonM say tnls Steve he's really a dedicated guy tle doesnl dnnk He doesn't SmoKe He works hard But Ithink
as tar as running a company and maktng money, tnars not h s bag
A

Q: Is there somethlng afoot here? Does the majority of the board feel that way? You sound like you're ready to make a change

A: I'd be honest with you. I'd have made a change a long time ago. But I don't think the rest ofthe board is ready.
Q: Have you tried to pemuade them of that?

A: We've had diicussmns.,..Every time we have a board meeting we havewhat we call an executive session of the board excluding all Micron
employees (meaning Appteton left the room)....We talk about a lot of these problems among ourselves and then one member of the bmrd wili
tell Steve what we discussed and what we recommend.
Q: Have you suggested t o your colleagues on the board that it's time for Steve t o be replaced?
A: Well. I'd say ME,we've had discussions about him giving up some of these duties and...giving them to somebody else. In other words,
lighten his load. We've done that with the presidency.
Q: Are you saying you are not confident in Appleton remtning as CEO?
A Welt. l'd put it to you lhls way Ihonestly thlnk it wodd be better for M~crortI we wuid k~ndof restructure the lop And I thlnk at th~spo.nt,
Sleve's st111a relattvely yourlg guy, and 11 mtght be better off for hlm to move on to somewhere else and give somebody else a chance. see
what they can do

i
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Q: Is that s case you\e made to the board?

A: Ihaven't been very forceful about it.
Q: Is that going to change? You're talking to a reporter about it

-are you thinking it's time for you to be more aggressive?

A There's no quesloc about me fact that the board needs to b m m e more aggressive. We've nad some dlscuss:ons aDoul that in the past
And to be honest with you. I can? tell you how the rest of the board members feel, bul Iwould suspect tnat the buld of them probably don't

ha've too many feelings one way or another because they haven*!been involved iong enough to know.
Q: Are you going to do anything about your feeling that it would be better for Appleton toflnd something else?
A: The only thing i can do is express to the board how i feel. And if the board doesn't want togo along with that, then nothingwiil happen. If

they feel tike they should, then something wiil.
Q: What's your next opportunity to do that?
A: Weil, probablywe won't have another board meeting until first part of September.
Q: So do you just stew on this until then?

A: Well, not exactly, but there are times when icali Steve and ask him what the hell's going on and so forth. But until we have a board
meeting Iwon't have an oppodunity to meet with the other board members.
Q: Have you told him directly that you think it's time for him to move on?
A: No. I haven't.

Q: Are Appleton's hobbies as a stunt pilot and racecar driver distracting him from his job?

A: Honestly. I don't think it is. because this guy's a pretty dedicated guy. He does do some of that but everybody does something to kind of
relieve their tensions and so forth, and that just happens to be something he does. But in all reaiily I don't think it gets in the way of what he's
trying to do for Micron.
Q: How would you summarize your criticism of Appletan?

A: Ijust don't think he's a money-maker. I think he's a heiluva guy, and he's dedicated, and he's got g w d personal habits. But you know,
there's several different ways to run a company but Ithink you have to have the shareholders interest at heart, especially in a public
corporation. And thars what you've got to be focused on.
Q: Has he been too shy of cost-cutting and too protective of jobs in Idaho?

A: I lhlnk irs been a real factor. He's been very, very reiuctanl to try lo do &hat he's doing naw. And Ican understand that. But I mink probably
where the mistake was made is that we let these departments and everyihing grow t w big and become t w cumbersome And you know, yo5
get t w many people involved and this is what happens
Q: When should the costcutting have started?
A: Llke I told yw I thlnk we really should have tanen a hard look at ths five or six years ago. But il's more involved than that. It goas back to

strategic plantimg: What dircclion are you gonna go? That's uhere Ikinda lhink vre fell down is not being able to put tnat road map out in ton!
of everybody and say this is the direction we need to be going

0 : Has Micron's loss of leadership i n die size and the number of layers on a chip been important to the decline i n competiiveness?

A: Sure. power is a big issue. Size is a big issue. Speed is a big issue. Those are the things thal you need to work on.
Q: Has research and development not kept up ilke It did in the old days?

A: We've got a tremendous effort out there. My feeling is that a lot of those guys have really wme up with some greatthings, but we seem to
have a real tough problem in geeing those ideas to market. We're atways maybe just a lime late.
Q: Is there an example of that?
4: You take Samsung, o x largest cornpelttor. We all seem to be working on the same thing, but it seems to me like theyre the ones that are
gorterally in the mahot 6rst Ann that llas a big impact because ify w can get into the market with a product ahead of the other guy your
chances of mak~nga tot of money are really great. But once tne rest of 'em catch up and get lnto the market. then there go the margins.

Q: What do you think of the decision to sell Micron PC and Mlcron Custom Manufacturing Services? Wouldn't that help you in a
down market like this?
4: No. Thars a hlghly competitive - geeing into that retail market and evelything. thal's tough. And even people that are in it struggle.

,;):I
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Q: YOUServed on board wtth the Joe and Ward Parkinson, Jack Simplot, Allen Noble. Ron Yanke and Tom Nicholsm. YOUme1
everv Monday at 6 a.m. and some would show up at 4 p.m. Mondays to watch management's weekly reports. It was very hands on
The Eurrent board had seven meetings i n fiscal 2006. Which works bener?
A: Well, if you can get a board thars more hands on and if you have a culture where people feel they can talk to other people and they can

discuss problems and things like that, I think that's a lot betler atmosphere than having one that's so formal and everyihing's structured, that
you just don't get as much accomplished.
fs
r
Q: Is it naive to think youcan have a board like that? In 1895,24 percent of the company was owned by coie
now it's 2 percent, so you don't have the personal stake7

and directors and

A: Thars true...1t.s a question of focus. And if you bring a board member on, you ought to look for a board member that's focused on making
money and is wncerned about shareholder value and things like that. if you bring pwple on that are just interested in having their name on a
board of directors somewhere, then I think that's wrong.
Q: Is that the case wlth some of your colleagues-

it's for the resume and the $225,000 you get as a director?

A: Let me say thm: I think it's becoming more and more difficult to find good board members. And it's a real job to find the kind of board

member that you really would like.
Q: Should a shareholder or citizen of ldahobe concerned that two of the directors have connections to Lam Research. which
Micron paid $89 milllon in fiscal 20067 is that a problem? Are they truly independent directon?

A. When we brought (Lam Research Corp. CEO James) Bagley on as a board member (in 1997), 1 think it was the board's feeling and mine
too. that here's a guy that travels around the world, he's in all the other companies, he's probably got something that would be very valuable to
Micron iust his knowledae of what's aoina on in the world. And to a certain extent. Jim's been very valuable in that respect. But t lhink
underlyingthat is the fact &at he does L o w that he has a lot of business with Micron

-

Q: Does that compromise hls independence7 Is It going to be harder to convince Bagiey that it's time for Appleton to move on
because of hls company's buslness relationship wlth Micron?
A: Ithink Jim would test the water very carefully, and if he felt like maybe Steve would be ail right with something like'that, then Ithink he'd
support it.
Q: Are you saying he'd be more loyal to Appleton than the shareholders?
A: I can't accuse him of that.
Q: But he wouldn't force him oul7
A: He wouldn't force him out

Q: Will you try to force Appleton out?
A: I'm not gonna really - I'm just going to tell the board how I feel about it. And I'm gonna tell them that its time, that this company needs a
wmplete overhaul as far as structure goes. And we need to become more focused on making money and these are the kind of the people
that we need. And that's gonna kinda be my pitch.
Q: Will you make that pitch Informally between now and September?
A: I've already expressed my feelings, but obviously, we're gonna have some morediscussion.
Q: Have you said directly to your colleagues that It's time to replace Appleton?
A: No. Ihaven't. But I'm certainly going to make them aware of my feelings. About theonly opportunity I'll have is the next board meeting....

Let me say something. Iprobably did a lime more talking than Ireally intended to. And Ihope you appreciate the situation because there are a
lot of people who are concerned, there's a lot of people who have feelings one way or another, and I'd have to say this, that i know Steve is
very. very wncerned about this whole thing. So. I guess I'd say be real careful about how you present it.
Q: Iunderstand you're sticking your neck out and you're asking us to

be mindful of that. Is that what you're saying7

A: Not so much that, other than the fact that it's a sensitive situation for a lot of people. And this is just one man's opinion
Q: You don't have a consensus on the board to do any of this?

A: That's right.
Q: Is there anything the state can do t o encourage Micronto grow here7
A YOU know. l tlunk the problems tnat tney've go1are more worldwde tn nature because a really bolls down lo a ampctetllive situation How do

wo mmDete w!tb a plan! in Chtna versus one in the U S 7 If we were Justwmpetlng wth U S manufacturers we could get r ght on top of thls

);in
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and probably beat 'em. But when you turn out a wafer here that wsts us anywhere from $1.800 to $2,000 or maybe more and China can turn
out the same damn wafer for six, seven, eight hundred doilars, thars tough.
Q: How much of Micron is going to remain in Boise?
A: That I can't teli you but Iwould teli you for sure that Iknow Steve would do everything he can to keep as much of it here as he possibly

could. Ithink the board would feel that way. There's none of the board members that want to see our foreign operations grow at the expense
of what we've got here in the U.S.
Q: How about the rumors of a private equlty buyout involving the Blackstone Group or another bidder? Is there any truth to that?
A: That3 something that Iwuidn't comment on because I don't even know enough about it.

Q: Have they been nosing around?

A: Not to my knowledge. I've heard rumors, but i haven't actually seen any evidence of it....The only thing Ican say is I don't really know
anything about it
Q: Could the Boise site be convertedto manufacture 300mm wafers?
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- that oroductlon somewhere else to be more comoetitive. To A
somewhere liue that. Tnere's a huge market ovet there. Between India and China you're talking awut damn near 3 billton people ana you
firtow they've just come around lo tne fact that everybooy wants a cell phone. ana everybody wants a new automobile. And you know ips a
huge market But if you can hre an eng,tleer. a topnotch engineer lhat maybe has even been (rained in the Unlted States for say $25,000 to
$30.000 a year and you pay the same guy here maybe $175.000, that's tough wmpetition
A. I don't think thnt'a the
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there any advantages to staying here in ldaho?

A: I'd say the only advantage 1s if you can make what you have here work. You don't have any more brick and mortar to spend money on, can
we become more efficient, can we get our wsts down? You know, it's worth a try.

Q: Is any effort being put into that?

A: Absolutely

Q: You're making every effort to keep as many jobs in ldaho as you can?
A: Oh yeah.
Q: Five years from now, could you predict where Micron will be in ldaho and how iarge it will be?

A Vve,l, there's a lot of ifs But niy feeling is If we are able to do some ot tne tti#lysthat I th nn need to be done. I inink tnefe's a heck of a
good chance we c a l have a ~ l a b l ewmpan) and 11Iibe dotng good
Q: And its presence in ldaho?
A: And I'd say there's no reason why there shouldn't be a good presence in ldaho and maybe in the rest of the world, too.
Q: What's it going t o take to turn the stock price around?
A: There's only one thing that's going to turn that around. We're going to have to make money. And Ithink thars possible but we've got to get
at I\.It might take a whole new management group that can get this job done, including maybe a new board of directors.

Q: Could that happen in September?
A: No, no. There'd have to be a timeline you'd have to walk down.

Lel me say tnts to you: We havc got some rea1.y great people our there a! Micron. A lot of Uiese gd)s that work in all these oepartments and
wmk in those labs and 81 the RBD. And I've seen those guys - most of mem are young g ~ ) swith a lot of gosd ideas -and snool. they'll
work ail hours of the day to get the job done.

Q: And you want to make it posslble for them to keep working here?
A: Exadty.

Q: Why has Micron been reluctant to talk to the media about layoffs7

-

-

A: Well, I think the reluctance is and I have the same reluctance you hate to say very muoh about anylhing bemuse you honestly don't
know exactly what will happen and what won't. And everybody is hoping that these cuts are not gonna go any deeper than they already have
So, there's a real reluctance on the part of anybody out there to say too much
Q: Did you know Appleton has spoken to one media outlet, KTVB. He won't talk t o us, hasn't in many months.

,I, 6
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A: Why?
Q: Apparently something to do with reporting his injuries i n his plane crash were worse than he originally said. You dldn't know

that?
A: That's the first time I've heard that

Q: Did you know we'd been blackballed?
A: NO. Nor anybody else...You know I don't have any knowledge of why

Q: In 2003, the company was more forthcoming about layoffs. What3 dlfferent this time? Is it that the situation more gave, a
wholesaie restrudurlng as opposed to temporary downsizing that's market related?

A: No, no. I wouldn't characterize it as that. Whafs going on is they're hying to get the company back into a position where they can make
money and they're competitive and that's what's driving it.
Q: DOyou recall the company being more forthcoming i n '037

A: No, honestly. l'd say it's about the same.
Q: Do you think the company's been fair to the employees with severance packdges?
A There's a lot of mmpantes throughout !he U S that are golc:g through lhls kind of a s<tbatlonr,gnt now. Mowrola 8s one, and even Salllsung

nas startea restr~ctunna,esoeclallv thelr cnlp busmess So they're al, going through it And Ithlnk our people are trying lo stay pretty much in
line with what the i n d u s i ~ sdoing.?hey're p;obably not doing any more, but they're certainly trying not to do any less
Q: So you think it's been fair when compared to the rest of the marketplace?
A: Yeah. Absolutely.
Q: Is is e reasonable expectation that you can keep the majority of your operations In the United States?
A: Well, Iwwldnl say that. I'd say that you don't know for.sure what you have to do. But the question would be is to try to keep as much of
the business as you can in the United States and be as mmpetitie. And just because somebody else thinks they have to move their
producUon to China doesn't mean we have to, unless that's the only way to be competitive....
I m glv~nqyo4 one person's oplnion It's ~ I n d
of the way I see it and the way i fee4 Non, there m~ghtbe other ward members tnat ~ o u l o
dtsagree wth me 10c ilercenl And Ihc sarne wlth maybe Steve and some of h s people - lhey may not see it the way I see 11

Q: We haven't been able to put questions dirediy to the company. so it's enormously helpful tQhave you talk to us. What Ihear you
saying Is, I'm one of seven, these are my views. H doesn't mean the company's going to do what ithlnk. Ihave one vote.
A: Yeah

Q. YOUwouldn't say that your call for Appleton's departure Is insignificant, would you?

A: No, but I'd preface that in that in effect he's had three titles for quite some time. What I'm saying is the wmpany is in a very bad need of
some real solid strategic direction. OK? One man can't fill all those slots.
Q: Maybe Imisunderstandyou. When you say it's time for him to move on, you meant leave the company? Are you saylng that he
just needs to take a lesser role?
A: Here again, this is just my opinion. I don't know that he could be effective by taking a lesser role.

Q: So you are saying it's time for him to live on the fruits of his laborthat have been very substantial or find another job?

A: Yeah. Ithink so. And i think the next time around the wmpany needs to restructure at the very top lev&. This idea of ietting oneguy have
three titles and trying to be everything to everybody - that doesn't work. And the culture of the wmpany has to change.
If you really boiled it down to the bottom line: No. 1, everybody has to be profit-oriented, everybody has to be cash-flow oriented. Bottom line
that's what should be the criteria. How much cash-flow can you develop and how proftable.
This idea of trying to run a wmpany and not pay attention to those basics is crazy.
Q: Will you teli Appleton that he should talk to the media?
A: I'll do it. Hey listen. I'm gonna teli him that Italked to you. I don't want him to get biindsided

Exhibit C
(Exhibit D to Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion Filed October 12,2007)

CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY

The Division has a policy of according leniency to
corporations reporting their illegal antitrust activity at an
early stage, if they meet certain conditions.

"Leniency" means

not charging such a firm criminally for the activity being
reported.

(The policy also is known as the corporate amnesty or

corporate immunity policy.)

A.

Leniencv Before an Investiqation Haa Bequn

Leniency will be granted to a corporation reporting illegal
activity before an investigation has begun, if the following six
conditions are met:
1.

At the time the corporation comes forward to report the

illegal activity, the Division has not received information
about the illegal activity being reported from any other
source;
2.

The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal

activity being reported, took prompt and effective action to
terminate its part in the activity;

3.

The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and

completeness and provides full, continuing and complete
cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation;
4.

The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as

opposed to isolated confessions of individual executives or
officials;
5.

Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to

injured parties; and
6.

The corporation did not coerce another party to

participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the
leader in, or originator of, the activity.

B.

Alternative Reauirements for Leniency

If a corporation comes forward to report illegal antitrust
activity and does not meet all six of the conditions set out in
Part A, above, the corporation, whether it comes forward before
or after an investigation has begun, will be granted leniency if
the following seven conditions are met:
1.

The corporation is the first one to come forward and

qualify for leniency with respect to the illegal activity
being reported;
2.

The Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does

not yet have evidence against the company that is likely to
result in a sustainable conviction;

3.

The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal

activity being reported, took prompt and effective action to
terminate its part in the activity;
4. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and

completeness and provides full, continuing and complete
cooperation that advances the Division in its investigation;
5.

The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as

opposed to isolated confessions of individual executives or
officials;
6.

Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to

injured parties; and
7.

The Division determines that granting leniency would not

be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal
activity, the confessing corporation's role in it, and when
the corporation comes forward.
In applying condition 7, the primary considerations will be
how early the corporation comes forward and whether the
corporation coerced another party to participate in the illegal
activity or clearly was the leader in, or originator of, the
activity. The burden of satisfying condition 7 will be low if
the corporation comes forward before the Division has begun an
investigation into the illegal activity.

That burden will

increase the closer the Division comes to having evidence that is
likely to result in a sustainable conviction.

C.

Leniency for Corporate Directors, Officers, and Em~lovees
If a corporation qualifies for leniency under Part A, above,

all directors, officers, and employees of the corporation who
admlt their involvement in the illegal antitrust activity as part
of the corporate confession will receive leniency, in the form of
not being charged criminally for the illegal activity, if they
admlt their wrongdoing with candor and completeness and continue
to assist the Division throughout the investigation.
If a corporation does not qualify for leniency under Part A,
above, the directors, officers, and employees who come forward
with the corporation will be considered for immunity from
criminal prosecution on the same basis as if they had approached
the Division individually.

D. Leniency Procedure
If the staff that receives the request for leniency believes
the corporation qualifies for and should be accorded leniency, it
should forward a favorable recommendation to the Office of
Operations, setting forth the reasons why leniency should be
granted.

Staff should not delay making such a recommendation

until a fact memo recommending prosecution of others is prepared.
The Director of Operations will review the request and forward it
to the Assistant Attorney General for final decision.

If the

staff recommends against leniency, corporate counsel may wish to
seek an appointment with the Director of Operations to make their

views known.

Counsel are not entitled to such a meeting as a

matter of right, but the opportunity will generally be afforded.
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